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THE FATAL FIALA FLAW: Hey! Why Not
Just Make Arbitration Agreements
Mandatory?
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This Article discusses the ability of healthcare agents to bind their principals with arbitration agreements when admitting their principals to nursing homes. A recent Illinois appellate court decision had the unfortunate effect of allowing nursing homes to expand the authority of healthcare agents
to encompass arbitration agreements by simply making such agreements a
requirement for admission. Although this ruling has the potential to further
disadvantage people who are already unable to care for themselves, this Article will discuss approaches that can be used to correct the misstep.
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INTRODUCTION

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in 2013
there were 1.4 million nursing home residents in the United States, and as the
baby boomer generation ages, this number is expected to skyrocket.1 Moving
a parent or loved one into a nursing home is often one of the most painful
and difficult decisions that a person will have to make, and the law in Illinois
is now making the decision-making process even more worrisome.2 Generally, healthcare proxies are selected when a person becomes unable to
properly make their own healthcare decisions. A person usually selects his or
her loved ones to act as healthcare proxies, and naturally those loved ones
care deeply about their principals.3 This makes the decision to place a person
in a nursing home extremely difficult because it corresponds with deterioration in health, a fall, or some other difficulty.4 The admission process into a
nursing home is difficult for both the soon-to-be resident and their loved
ones, and both will struggle with these dramatic changes. While their principals are in an emotionally weakened state, these healthcare proxies are called
upon to make difficult decisions about how their loved one will be cared for.5
Families often disagree about the course of treatment to be taken, which facility should be used, and any number of other issues; this strife further adds
to the complexity of the decision making process.6 Once a care facility is
selected, a stack of paperwork is brought out for the proxies to read and fill
out, and unsurprisingly, proxies often overlook some details in the mountain
of paperwork.7 Arbitration agreements are one such component in the admission packet that is often overlooked and frequently misunderstood.8 These
arbitration agreements are generally forgotten until the woeful day when

1. CTRS.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/nursing-home-care.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2015).
2. Sarah Baldauf, Step 1: Decide if a Nursing Home is Necessary, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. HEALTH (Mar. 11, 2009, 3:00 PM), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/bestnursing-homes/articles/2009/03/11/figure-out-whether-a-nursing-home-is-needed.
3. Giving Someone a Power of Attorney for Your Health-Care, AM. BAR ASS’N iii
(2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/2011/2011_aging_hcdec_univhcpaform_4_2012_v2.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Giving Someone a Power of Attorney for Your Health-Care].
4. Baldauf, supra note 2.
5. Lisa Schencker, Nursing Homes’ Use of Binding Arbitration Comes Under Fire,
MOD.
HEALTHCARE
(Aug.
8,
2015),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150808/MAGAZINE/308089979.
6. Giving Someone a Power of Attorney for Your Health-Care, supra note 3.
7. See Schencker, supra note 5.
8. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care
Facilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 42168, 42211 (proposed July 16, 2015) (codified November 2016 as
42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n)).
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something goes terribly wrong for the resident.9 Then, when the resident
seeks to bring suit against the nursing home, the healthcare provider moves
to compel arbitration, and a legal battle ensues.10 There has been significant
disagreement about the use of arbitration agreements in nursing home contexts, but the Federal Arbitration Act preempts most state legislation that has
sought to categorically exclude such provisions.11 Recently, Illinois, among
other states, has exacerbated the issue by holding that healthcare agents’ authority to bind their principals to arbitration could be expanded by healthcare
providers.12 The recent ruling expanded the authority of healthcare proxies
to bind their principals to agreements that are not well understood and are
highly controversial. The authority of healthcare proxies is generally limited
to healthcare decisions, but in some contexts the line between what is considered a healthcare decision and what is not becomes unclear.13 The Second
District Appellate Court in Illinois ruled that when arbitration agreements
were required for admission to a healthcare facility the healthcare agent could
bind the principal to arbitration even though the agent would not have had
the authority if the agreement were not a requirement.14 This ruling gives
nursing home facilities the proverbial nod to require arbitration agreements
in all of their admission packets, which is exactly what state legislatures and
the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has sought to prevent.15
This Comment will discuss the basics of healthcare proxies, and then
provide an analysis of Fiala v. Bickford Senior Living Group, which is the
seminal Illinois case regarding the expansion of healthcare proxy authority.16
This analysis will be followed by general background information regarding
the authority of healthcare agents and nursing home arbitration agreements.
Next, there will be an analysis on the three major schools of thought across
the country regarding the authority of healthcare agents. These three schools
of thought will be referred to as the “Broad-scope,” “Narrow-scope,” and
“Conscionable” groups. Then, this Comment will analyze some potential approaches Illinois can and should implement in order to improve Illinois law.
Lastly, this Comment will take a look at how recent rules proposed by the
CMS might affect the issue of whether and when healthcare agents have the
authority to bind their principals to arbitration.
9. Schencker, supra note 5.
10. Schencker, supra note 5.
11. See Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 927 N.E.2d 1207, 1215 (Ill. 2010).
12. Fiala v. Bickford Senior Living Grp., 32 N.E.3d 80, 93 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
13. Hogan v. Country Villa Health Servs., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 450, 454-55 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007).
14. Fiala, 32 N.E.3d at 93.
15. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care
Facilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 42211 (proposed July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
483.70(n)).
16. Fiala, 32 N.E.3d at 80.
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BACKGROUND

HEALTHCARE PROXIES

As people become unable to take care of themselves someone else is
often appointed to make healthcare decisions for them; this relationship is
known as a healthcare proxy.17 There are three types of relationships associated with healthcare proxies: agents, surrogates, and guardians.18 This article
will be focusing on healthcare agents and surrogates, because these agency
relationships are the most common with nursing home residents.
A healthcare agent can also be known as a “durable power of attorney
for healthcare.”19 The difference is solely based on what a particular state
chooses to refer to the relationship as, and is known as a “healthcare agent”
in Illinois.20 Illinois healthcare agencies are controlled by statute21 where a
healthcare agent is defined as, “an agency governing any type of healthcare,
anatomical gift, autopsy or disposition of remains for and on behalf of a patient and refers to the power of attorney or other written instrument defining
the agency or the agency, itself, as appropriate to the context.”22 These agents
are granted power through an advanced directive which legally names them
as the other person’s decision maker.23 The decision maker is known as the
agent, and is authorized to make decisions on behalf of the principal—which
in this case would be the person the treatment is on the behalf of.
Healthcare surrogates differ from healthcare agents because there is
generally no formal document stating that the surrogate has control over
healthcare decisions.24 This role is usually filled out of necessity by family
members or even close friends.25 These proxies are required because of an
absence of a formal agency relationship, and accordingly have less decision

17. Making Medical Decisions for Someone Else: A How-To Guide, AM. BAR ASS’N
1 (2009), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/2011_aging_bk_proxy_guide_gen.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Making Medical Decisions for
Someone Else].
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Fiala, 32 N.E.3d at 93.
21. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/4-4 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-906 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
22. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/4-4(c) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-906 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
23. Making Medical Decisions for Someone Else, supra note 17.
24. Making Medical Decisions for Someone Else, supra note 17.
25. Making Medical Decisions for Someone Else, supra note 17.
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making authority.26 In Illinois, healthcare surrogates are controlled by the
Health Care Surrogate Act.27
When selecting a healthcare proxy, people are recommended to select
someone who they are able to talk to about their wishes, that lives fairly close,
that they trust, that can handle conflicting opinions, and who will be a strong
advocate if the healthcare provider is unresponsive.28 Naturally, the choice
for such an appointment is someone who is extremely close with the resident,
and as such the person probably cares deeply for the resident.29 However, the
people selected to be healthcare agents rarely have any legal training and can
quickly become overwhelmed by the experience.30 Arbitration agreements
are frequently buried in stacks of papers that the agents are supposed to thoroughly read and then sign, but nonetheless, these provisions often go unnoticed, are not understood, or are thought to be required—even when they are
not.31 Disputes about the enforceability of arbitration agreements arise when
grievances are brought before the court by a resident, or on the behalf of a
resident, against the healthcare provider.32 The residents, or their agents, then
seek to have these agreements set aside on the grounds that the proxy did not
have the authority to bind the principal to arbitration.33
B.

AUTHORITY AS A HEALTHCARE AGENT

A healthcare power of attorney creates a fiduciary relationship between
agents and their principals.34 These agents are limited to matters involving
healthcare, and should have no authority to manage or control a principal’s
affairs outside the scope of healthcare decisions unless expressly provided in
the directive that gave the agent authority.35 An agent may have actual or
apparent authority to act on behalf of the principal, and actual authority may
be expressed or implied.36 Most cases where a healthcare agent’s authority to
bind the principal to an arbitration agreement is called into question hinges
on whether the agent had actual authority.37 Actual authority tends to be the
26. Making Medical Decisions for Someone Else, supra note 17.
27. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/5 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-906 of the 2016
Reg. Sess.).
28. Giving Someone a Power of Attorney for Your Health-Care, supra note 3.
29. Giving Someone a Power of Attorney for Your Health-Care, supra note 3.
30. See Schencker, supra note 5.
31. See Schencker, supra note 5.
32. See Schencker, supra note 5.
33. Fiala v. Bickford Senior Living Grp., 32 N.E.3d 80, 91 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
34. In re Estate of Stahling, 987 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
35. Id. at 1040.
36. Patrick Eng’g, Inc. v. Naperville, 976 N.E.2d 318, 329 (Ill. 2012).
37. E.g., Dickerson v. Longoria, 995 A.2d 721, 731 (Md. 2010); Curto v. Illini Manors, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 229, 232 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
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crux of the issue because the actual language of an agency agreement sets
limitations on the agent’s authority.38 This is true for durable power of attorneys, healthcare surrogates, and healthcare proxies.39 Express authority is
“actual authority that a principal has stated in very specific or detailed language.”40 Implied authority is actual authority to do what is necessary to perform an agent’s expressed responsibilities or to act in a manner that the agent
reasonably believes is in keeping with the principal’s objectives based on his
manifestations.41 If a principal’s instructions or grant of authority leaves
room for the agent to exercise discretion regarding the limits of his or her
authority then the agent should look at the potential consequences that the
actions may create for the principal.42 If the consequences are particularly
serious then the agent’s authority to perform such acts should be questioned.43 Some situations where reasonable agents should understand that
that their actions would be outside of the scope of authority that the principal
intended to authorize are instances where the act “create[s] no prospect of
economic advantage for [the] principal” or where the act would “create legal
consequences for a principal that are significant and separate from the transaction specifically directed by the principal.”44
C.

ARBITRATION
Arbitration is defined as:
A dispute-resolution process in which the disputing
parties choose one or more neutral third parties to
make a final and binding decision resolving the dispute. The parties to the dispute may choose a third
party directly by mutual agreement, or indirectly,
such as by agreeing to have an arbitration organization select the third party.45

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Fiala, 32 N.E.3d at 89-90.
See id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
Id.
Arbitration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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Despite significant litigation and numerous struggles to avoid arbitration, there are in fact some benefits to arbitration in particular circumstances.46 Arbitration can benefit parties by being faster and more cost effective than a trial.47 It can be more economical due to lower discovery costs
and fewer pre-trial motions.48 Arbitration can also, arguably, speed along the
recovery process.49 But, arbitration is a “creature of contract,” and so it is the
wording and language of each particular provision that determines the scope
and enforceability of an arbitration provision.50
Arbitration was originally intended for transactions between parties
with relatively equal bargaining power, but these provisions are now sprinkled throughout even the most unassuming consumer transactions.51 Nursing
homes view arbitration agreements as a chance to avoid costly litigation and
to limit the damage to their reputations, and so these agreements have become
extremely prevalent despite how unfavorable they can be for the residents.52
The problem is that many of the residents and their family members, who
generally become their healthcare agents, do not read these documents before
they sign them, and these agreements are never explained to them.53 Even
those that do read the documents often do not understand what an arbitration
agreement is.54 Furthermore, the experience of admitting a loved one into a
nursing home can already be a difficult and stressful time for family members, and the emotional toll adds on to the whirlwind of change and confusion
that arises during the search for an acceptable facility, getting their loved one
admitted, and then trying to get him or her situated.55 Unfortunately, many
nursing home facilities use this general state of upheaval for their own nefarious gain. As the masters of the arbitration contracts, these facilities are able
to significantly mitigate their own risk and exposure while substantially burdening residents and capping any potential ability to recover against them. 56

46. See Paul J. Masinter & Nicholas J. Wehlen, Arbitration: The Good, the Bad, and
the Ugly, AM. BAR 1, http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0038/materials/pp8.pdf
(last visited Sept. 30, 2016).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 3.
51. Anne E. Krasuski, Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Do Not Belong in Nursing
Home Contracts with Residents, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 263, 263 (2004) [hereinafter
Krasuski].
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 264.
55. See id. at 263-64.
56. Krasuski, supra note 51, at 267-68.

2016]

THE FATAL FIALA FLAW

43

All the while, the residents and their families are completely oblivious until
it is too late.57
When nursing homes side step the court system through arbitration there
are dramatic repercussions for residents, because arbitration can be prohibitively expensive, the informal nature reduces the availability of discovery,
and the private nature of arbitration prevents potential residents from learning
about issues that may have deterred them from a particular facility. 58 Even
though one of the primary reasons for using arbitration is to save money, the
savings are not passed along to the residents and the arbitration costs can be
prohibitively expensive.59
Arbitration costs can be extremely high, and even cost splitting provisions often leave potential litigants unable to afford to bring the suit.60 Furthermore, there are generally lower awards returned for claims decided by
arbitration rather than litigation. Statistics show that residents get different
results when they are heard in court versus arbitration.61 Out of 1,794 claims
filed between 2004 and 2013, residents were 33% less likely to receive any
payment when using arbitration. Residents were 10% less likely to receive an
award between $1 - $250,000 when going through arbitration, 15% less likely
to receive an award between $250,000 - $1,000,000, and 68.4% less likely to
receive an award greater than a million dollars.62 These statistics show that
nursing home residents are significantly disadvantaged by seeking recovery
through arbitration in lieu of the courts.63
Would-be plaintiffs are severely disadvantaged by the limited discovery, because nearly all the evidence of a facility’s wrongdoing is in the facility’s possession.64 Arbitrators are not bound by the rules of evidence, and so
it is difficult to predict how they might decide.65 Even though it is possible
that arbitrators could show leniency for the resident, the odds are still stacked
in the defendant’s favor because he or she is the party that is the most likely
to have had an opportunity to see how the arbitrators tend to rule and will
have acted accordingly.66
The private nature of arbitration is against the interest of the public and
residents, because if cases were brought publicly in court, the news and media would have the opportunity to recognize trends and increase public
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See Schencker, supra note 5.
Krasuski, supra note 51, at 265-68.
Krasuski, supra note 51, 292-93.
See Krasuski, supra note 51, at 293.
See Schencker, supra note 5.
See Schencker, supra note 5.
See Schencker, supra note 5.
Krasuski, supra note 51, at 299.
Krasuski, supra note 51, at 299.
Krasuski, supra note 51, at 299.
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awareness.67 When instances of nursing home negligence or lack of care are
kept private by arbitration the public is deprived of the opportunity to see the
“egregiously poor care” that is provided, which causes society to lose its opportunity to act as a vehicle for change.68

III.

FIALA V. BICKFORD SENIOR LIVING GROUP

In Fiala v. Bickford Senior Living Group,69 Edward Fiala, a resident of
Bickford Senior Living Group, sued the facility for violating the Nursing
Home Care Act70 as well as other tortious behavior.71 The facility moved to
dismiss Mr. Fiala’s claim in order to pursue arbitration based on the agreement that his daughter, acting as attorney in fact, had signed, but the trial
court denied the motion.72 The arbitration provision stated that:
Any controversy, claim or dispute arising out of or
relating to this Establishment Contract or the breach
thereof, shall be settled by arbitration administered
by the American Arbitration Association in accordance with its rules and judgment upon the award
rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any
court having jurisdiction thereof. The award of the
arbitrator(s) shall be final and binding upon the parties without the right of appeal to the courts. The
arbitrators will have no authority to award punitive
damages or any other damages not measured by the
prevailing party's actual damages, and may not, in
any event, make any ruling, finding or award that
does not conform to the terms and conditions of the
Contract. The parties shall each bear its own costs
and expenses and an equal share of the arbitrators’
and administrative fees of arbitration.73
The trial court reasoned that although his daughter, acting as a
healthcare power of attorney, had the authority to sign the documents admit-

67. Krasuski, supra note 51, at 300.
68. Krasuski, supra note 51, at 300.
69. Fiala v. Bickford Senior Living Grp., 32 N.E.3d 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
70. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1-101 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-906 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
71. Fiala, 32 N.E.3d at 83.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 84.
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ting Mr. Fiala to the facility, she “did not have the authority to agree to arbitrate any other matters related to finances or property rights of [Mr. Fiala].”74
The facility appealed arguing that Mr. Fiala’s daughter, as the healthcare
power of attorney, had the authority to bind Mr. Fiala to arbitration.75
The facility’s argument on appeal was that because a healthcare power
of attorney is statutorily able to sign an admission contract, which included
the arbitration provision, Mr. Fiala was validly bound by it.76 Based on the
Powers of Attorney for Health Care law77 a person is allowed the right to:
[C]ontrol all aspects of his or her personal care and
medical treatment, including the right to decline
medical treatment or to direct that it be withdrawn,
even if death ensues. The right of the individual to
decide about personal care overrides the obligation
of the physician and other health care providers to
render care or to preserve life and health.
However, if the individual becomes a person with a
disability, her or his right to control treatment may
be denied unless the individual, as principal, can
delegate the decision making power to a trusted
agent and be sure that the agent's power to make
personal and health care decisions for the principal
will be effective to the same extent as though made
by the principal.78
This law lets a person choose an agent to make health care decisions for
himself as though he were making his own decisions.79 The facility further
argued that Mr. Fiala had used the statutory short form power of attorney for
health care, which, in the pertinent sections, expressly allows:80
(2) The agent is authorized to admit the principal to
or discharge the principal from any and all types of
hospitals, institutions, homes, residential or nursing
facilities, treatment centers and other health care institutions providing personal care or treatment for
any type of physical or mental condition. . . .
74. Id. at 85.
75. Id. at 85-86.
76. Fiala, 32 N.E.3d at 88.
77. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/4-1 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-906 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
78. Id.
79. Fiala, 32 N.E.3d at 89.
80. Id.
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(3) The agent is authorized to contract for any and
all types of health care services and facilities in the
name of and on behalf of the principal and to bind
the principal to pay for all such services and facilities, and to have and exercise those powers over the
principal's property as are authorized under the statutory property power, to the extent the agent deems
necessary to pay health care costs; and the agent
shall not be personally liable for any services or care
contracted for on behalf of the principal.81
The importance of this language is that it allows the power of attorney to sign
all the documents needed to enter into healthcare decisions.82
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the lower court’s determination
and found that Mr. Fiala’s daughter had the authority to bind him to arbitration.83 The court concluded that when she signed the contract, which contained the arbitration provision, she had the authority to bind her father because it was reasonably necessary to procure Mr. Fiala’s needed healthcare.84
The court then distinguished Mr. Fiala’s case from the general limitations on
the scope of a healthcare power of attorney—which normally provides no
authority over property or financial matters.85
The appellate court stated that, “health-care decisions, such as placement in an assisted-living facility, are not so cut and dried.”86 Several recent
cases from neighboring states trended towards allowing healthcare decision
makers to decide “collateral issues.”87 These collateral issues refer to areas
that are outside the scope of authority of what a reasonable agent would believe their principal intended.88 The court held that an arbitration clause was
one of those collateral issues.89 Arbitration agreements are considered collateral issues because they are signed by healthcare agents while they are arguably fulfilling their responsibilities. The court determined that the crux of the
issue is whether the arbitration provision was a standalone agreement that
81. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/4-10(c) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-906 of
the 2016 Reg. Sess.).
82. Fiala, 32 N.E.3d at 90.
83. Id. at 83.
84. Id. at 91.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. E.g., Dickerson v. Longoria, 995 A.2d 721, 738-39 (Md. 2010); Koricic v. Beverly Enters., 773 N.W.2d 145, 151 (Neb. 2009).
88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
89. Fiala, 32 N.E.3d at 91; accord Ping v. Beverly Enters., 376 S.W.3d 581, 600 (Ky.
2012); Dickerson, 995 A.2d at 739; Life Care Ctrs. of Am. v. Smith, 681 S.E.2d 182, 185 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2009); Koricic, 773 N.W.2d at 151.
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had no bearing on the admission of the resident, or whether the resident’s
admission was contingent on the arbitration agreement.90 If the arbitration
agreement was in addition to the required admission documents, then it
would be considered a “collateral issue,” and a healthcare agent would not
have the authority to bind the principal to the arbitration agreement.91 But,
where the agreement is required for admission, the healthcare agent has the
power to bind the principal to arbitration.92 The appellate court did not address the issue of whether the arbitration provision was unconscionable.

IV.

THREE-WAY SPLIT

States that have addressed the issue of whether healthcare power of attorneys are authorized to bind their principals to arbitration have arrived at
very different conclusions.93 The states’ rulings concerning whether and how
healthcare power of attorneys can bind their principals to arbitration provisions in nursing home agreements are roughly arranged into three viewpoints, these views will be referred to as the “Broad-scope group,” the “Narrow-scope group,” and the “Conscionable group.” The first group exists primarily in the courts of California, and somewhat in Massachusetts, where
they have held that healthcare agents have general authority to bind their
principals even where the arbitration provisions are not required.94 This
school of thought will be referred to as the “Broad-scope group.” The second
group, which Illinois now falls into, gives agents the power to bind their principals only where the arbitration agreement is required in order to admit the
resident.95 This group will be referred to as the “Narrow-scope group.” Additional states in this second category include Kentucky, Nebraska, Maryland, Georgia and West Virginia.96 The last group of states’ analyses are similar to the second—narrow—group’s, but takes the analysis one step further.
This group will be referred to as the “Conscionable group.” Under this
group’s rationale, an agent’s authority to sign an arbitration agreement is

90. Fiala, 32 N.E.3d at 92.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 92-93.
93. E.g., Carraway v. Beverly Enters. Ala., 978 So. 2d 27 (Ala. 2007); Hogan v.
Country Villa Health Servs., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 450 (Cal. App. Ct. 2007); Koricic, 773 N.W.2d
at 145.
94. Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537, 545 (Mass. 2007); Hogan, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
455; Garrison v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350, 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
95. Fiala v. Bickford Senior Living Grp., 32 N.E.3d 80, 92 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
96. State ex rel AMFM, LLC v. King, 740 S.E.2d 66, 75 (W. Va. 2013); Ping v.
Beverly Enters., 376 S.W.3d 581, 593 (Ky. 2012); Dickerson v. Longoria, 995 A.2d 721, 72829 (Md. 2010); Life Care Ctrs. of Am. v. Smith, 681 S.E.2d 182, 186 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009);
Koricic v. Beverly Enters., 773 N.W.2d 145, 151 (Neb. 2009).
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fairly liberally construed, but then an analysis of whether the arbitration provision is unconscionable is performed.97 This third group consists of Florida,
Ohio, Tennessee, Alabama, and New Mexico.98
Additionally, it is worth noting that Colorado actually has a statute, Colorado Revised Statutes Annotated §13-64-403,99 that explicitly forbids
healthcare providers from refusing medical care services solely because the
patient refused to sign an arbitration agreement.100 Although the statute requires arbitration provisions to be printed in bold-faced font immediately
preceding the signature line of arbitration agreements, the statute is not
preempted by the FAA because of what is known as “reverse-preemption.”101
Reverse preemption arises in McCarran – Ferguson Act and federally protects states’ rights to control the business of insurance.102
A.

AGENTS HAVE GENERAL POWER (BROAD-SCOPE GROUP)

The first group that will be discussed holds that healthcare agents have
broad decision making powers that encompass non-restricted powers that
arise during a healthcare decision.103 The Broad-scope group’s main proponent is California, which holds that healthcare agents’ powers are broadly
construed so as to allow the greatest amount of power for the agents.104 California reasons that these healthcare power of attorneys are granted so that
the agents are able to choose how their principals will be cared for.105 One of
the decisions that these agents need to be able to make is what facilities are
best for their principals.106 In making these decisions, California reasons that
these savvy agents are able to choose between facilities that require arbitration agreements, have optional arbitration agreements, or do not have arbitration agreements.107 California reasons that because these agents were able
97. See Owens v. Nat’l Health Corp., 263 S.W.3d 876, 888-89 (Tenn. 2007).
98. Barron v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 265 P.3d 720, 732-33
(N.M. Ct. App. 2011); Owens, 263 S.W.3d at 888-89; Carraway, 978 So. 2d at 31-32; Prieto
v. Healthcare & Ret. Corp. of Am., 919 So. 2d 531, 532-33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Small
v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 19, 23-24 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); Howell v. NHC
Healthcare Inc., 109 S.W.3d 731, 734 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
99. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403(7) (West, Westlaw through the 2d Reg. Sess.
of the 70th Gen. Assemb. 2016).
100. Id.
101. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403(4) (West, Westlaw through the 2d Reg. Sess.
of the 70th Gen. Assemb. 2016).
102. Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 382-84 (Colo. 2003).
103. Garrison v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350, 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
104. E.g., Hogan v. Country Villa Health Servs., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 450, 455 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007); Garrison, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 360.
105. See Garrison, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 359-60.
106. Id. at 360.
107. Id.
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to make the initial decision about where to house the resident they should
then retain the ability to sign any of the following arbitration agreements even
though it is not strictly a healthcare decision.108
Although this approach’s simplicity has some appeal, the problem is
that it allows far too broad of a swathe of authority for healthcare agents. As
the Narrow-scope group will discuss, these agents should have very limited
powers, and these limitations should not be exceeded.109 The authority under
an agency agreement should be limited to the plain language of the agreement, and additional authority should not be assumed. 110 An arbitration
agreement is a waiver of the principal’s legal rights and not a healthcare decision.111 So, unless the agency agreement specifically enumerates the authority to waive legal rights, or even more specifically to sign arbitration
agreements, then the healthcare agent should not have the authority to bind
the principal to arbitration.112 Furthermore, the Restatement (Third) of
Agency warns that acts which do not provide the principal an economic advantage or that create legal consequences for the principal should not be considered reasonable without specific communication.113 Based on this warning, arbitration agreements that are signed by healthcare agents should be
scrutinized to determine whether the agent was truly authorized to sign such
an agreement.114
Healthcare agents should not be reasonably able to bind their principals
to arbitration agreements that are not specifically authorized, because it
would create significant legal consequences for the principal and would provide little to no economic value. Arbitration agreements are, in essence, a
waiver of the principal’s right to access the courts and to be heard by a jury.115
Waiving the right to access the court and a jury has a serious legal consequence, and the importance of this right is demonstrated through the Seventh
Amendment.116 The Seventh Amendment simply states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Hogan, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d at 454.
See Ping v. Beverly Enters., 376 S.W.3d 581, 593 (Ky. 2012).
Id. at 592.
Dickerson v. Longoria, 995 A.2d 721, 737 (Md. 2010).
Id. at 737-38.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 cmt. h (AM. LAW. INST. 2006).
See Ping, 376 S.W.3d at 592.
Dickerson, 995 A.2d at 737.
U.S. CONST. amend VII.

50

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

8.1

the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.117
This simple, but crucial, right heralds back all the way to the Magna
Carta which was issued by the King of England and established that everyone
is subject to the law. This was one of the fundamental rights that the founding
fathers also believed that all men should have, and so they saw fit to include
it in the United States Constitution. This right was created so that every person would have the right to seek the protection of the courts and to be heard
by a jury of their peers.118 As such, this right should not be given away lightly,
and so healthcare agents should not be able to sign away their principals’
rights unless specifically authorized to do so.
Furthermore, when healthcare power of attorneys sign arbitration agreements on behalf of their principals, it often gives up the principals’ rights
without any economic advantage. In cases where an arbitration agreement is
not required for admission, the right to access the courts is literally being
given up for nothing.119 Although some would argue that an arbitration agreement itself provides an economic advantage, this is rarely true in the case of
consumer disputes or nursing home litigation.120 In fact, residents are actually
less likely to receive any recovery at all, and statistics show that any amount
they do receive is likely to be significantly less than it would have been in
court.121
The authority of the healthcare agents should not be expanded when it
has significant legal consequences for the principal or does not provide any
economic advantage for the principal.122 Arbitration agreements are prime
examples of where the scope of authority should not be expanded. First, arbitration agreements create significant legal consequences by stripping the
principals of their fundamental right to jury trials.123 Second, these arbitration
agreements are being foisted upon the residents while providing no economic
advantage.124 These are two of the three example situations provided by the
Restatement (Third) of Agency where the agent’s scope of authority should
be questioned.125 Despite the simplicity of the rule employed by the Broadscope group, courts should be extremely leery of expanding the authority of

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943).
Schencker, supra note 5.
Schencker, supra note 5.
Schencker, supra note 5.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
See generally Ping v. Beverly Enters., 376 S.W.3d 581 (Ky. 2012).
See, e.g., id.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
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healthcare agents, especially when running against the very situations warned
about by the Restatement.126
B.

ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS MUST BE REQUIRED FOR THE
PRINCIPAL TO BE BOUND (NARROW-SCOPE GROUP)

The Narrow-scope group of states holds that arbitration agreements and
provisions must be required for admission, and then it becomes “part and
parcel of the healthcare decision to admit the patient to the facility.”127 Courts
that apply this reasoning have concluded that healthcare powers of attorneys
are able to sign arbitration provisions as long as they are “part and parcel”
with the admission agreement.128 This reasoning is employed by states such
as Kentucky, Nebraska, Maryland, Georgia and West Virginia, and now Illinois.129 Unlike the Broad-scope group, the reasoning of these states is largely
in line with the Restatement (Third) of Agency, because it only expands
healthcare agents’ authority to bind their principals to arbitration provisions
when the provisions are “necessary to gain admission” to the care facility.130
These courts rightly limit the scope of authority that healthcare agents have
to bind their principals to only those limited areas that are necessary to carry
out an agent’s healthcare decisions and responsibilities.131 The Supreme
Court of Kentucky quoted the Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.02 comment h in support of this reasoning.132 The court reasoned that the ability to
authorize the resolution of disputes and to waive the principal’s rights should
not be inferred lightly.133
As previously explained, it is important to protect principals from unforeseen ramifications by not allowing the authority of healthcare agents to
be broadened beyond the areas that are expressly authorized.134 Unfortunately, this properly narrow interpretation has placed these states, and Illinois, in an awkward policy position. By saying that healthcare agents are only
able to bind their principals to arbitration agreements when the agreement is
required for admission, nursing home facilities are essentially being told,
“Hey! Why not just make arbitration agreements mandatory?” This can and
126. Id.
127. Fiala v. Bickford Senior Living Grp., 32 N.E.3d 80, 92 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
128. Id.
129. State ex rel. AMFM, LLC v. King, 740 S.E.2d 66, 75 (W. Va. 2013); Ping v.
Beverly Enters., 376 S.W.3d 581, 593 (Ky. 2012); Dickerson v. Longoria, 995 A.2d 721, 72829 (Md. 2010); Life Care Ctrs. of Am. v. Smith, 681 S.E.2d 182, 186 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009);
Koricic v. Beverly Enters., 773 N.W.2d 145, 151 (Neb. 2009).
130. Fiala, 32 N.E.3d at 92.
131. Ping, 376 S.W.3d at 593.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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will produce many dire and unwanted consequences if allowed, and is the
very problem that other states and agencies are concerned with preventing.135
Illinois case law is currently only halfway to producing the appropriate ruling
on the dilemma of healthcare agent authority.
C.

BROAD ABILITY TO BIND, BUT UNCONSCIONABILITY
MUST BE ADDRESSED (CONSCIONABLE GROUP)

The Conscionable group also allows healthcare agents a fairly broad
ability to bind their principals to arbitration agreements, but then the court
should address the issue of whether the arbitration contract or provision is
unenforceable based on unconscionability.136 This Conscionable group consists of Florida, Ohio, Tennessee, Alabama, and New Mexico.137 These states
reason that trying to split hairs between what constitutes a “healthcare decision” and what constitutes a “legal decision” would be nearly impossible.138
This would cause healthcare contracts to be too uncertain which would have
significant negative effects for the principal.139
For example, a mentally incapacitated principal
could be caught in “legal limbo.” The principal
would not have the capacity to enter into a contract,
and the attorney-in-fact would not be authorized to
do so. Such a result would defeat the very purpose
of a durable power of attorney for health care.140
While there is obviously a strong need to protect the power of healthcare
agents to procure care for their principals, there is also a need to protect these
same residents from arbitration agreements that are too overreaching and become unconscionable contracts.141

135. Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 42168,
42242 (July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n)).
136. Owens v. Nat’l Health Corp., 263 S.W.3d 876, 890 (Tenn. 2007).
137. Barron v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 265 P.3d 720, 726-27
(N.M. Ct. App. 2011); Owens, 263 S.W.3d at 885; Carraway v. Beverly Enters., 978 So. 2d
27, 30-31 (Ala. 2007); Prieto v. Healthcare and Ret. Corp. of Am., 919 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 19, 21 (Ohio Ct. App.
2004); Howell v. NHC Healthcare Inc., 109 S.W.3d 731, 734 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
138. Owens, 263 S.W.3d at 884-85.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 885.
141. Id. at 890.
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TENNESSEE

There are a few different tests that the Conscionable group of states use
to determine the enforceability of an arbitration provision or contract.142 In
Tennessee, the first element these courts look at to determine the enforceability of an arbitration agreement is whether the contract is offered on a “take
it or leave it” basis, and whether there was unequal bargaining power—this
is known as a “contract of adhesion.”143 Contracts of adhesion are not favored, but simply being a contract of adhesion is insufficient to immediately
render a contract unenforceable.144 Tennessee courts then look at “whether
the terms of the contract are beyond the reasonable expectations of an ordinary person, or oppressive or unconscionable” to the weaker party.145 Some
examples of where arbitration agreements are oppressive or unconscionable
to the weaker party include provisions where there is no option to revoke the
agreement to regain the right to a jury trial, where the provision is hidden,
where there is no opportunity to question the terms or purpose of the agreement, or when there is a choice between the right of a trial by jury or foregoing necessary medical treatment.146 Buraczynski v. Eyring contains a good
example of an arbitration agreement that was neither oppressive nor unconscionable.147
[The arbitration agreement] was not oppressive or
unconscionable because it was a stand-alone, one
page contract, with an attached explanation of its
purpose that encouraged the patient to ask questions, and which contained a “ten-point capital letter
red type, directly above the signature line that ‘by
signing this contract you are giving up your right to
a jury or court trial’ on any medical malpractice
claim.”148
The agreement also provided that it could be revoked by the patient within
thirty days.149 Conversely, an arbitration provision was held unenforceable

142. E.g., Howell, 109 S.W.3d at 734; Romano ex rel. Romano v. Manor Care, Inc.,
861 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
143. Howell, 109 S.W.3d at 734.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. 1996).
148. Howell, 109 S.W.3d at 734.
149. Id.
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where it was poorly explained, in the same font as the rest of the document,
buried on page ten, and presented on a “take it or leave it basis.”150

2.

FLORIDA

In Florida, to deny the enforcement of an arbitration agreement “the
contract must be both procedurally unconscionable and substantively unconscionable.”151 Procedural unconscionability refers to the circumstances under
which the contract was entered, while substantive unconscionability pertains
to the unfairness of the terms of the specific contract.152 Florida courts do not
have any precise requirement for how much of each type of unconscionability is required, and simply apply a “balancing approach” to the question of
unconscionability by determining if there is a quantum existence of each.153
Where an agreement is particularly unconscionable in one area it is able to
offset an only slight amount of unconscionability in the other.154

V.

So What Should Illinois and Undecided States Do?

Unfortunately, Illinois appears to have missed the proverbial boat in its
Fiala holding, because the court answered the question of whether the
healthcare agent had the authority to bind Mr. Fiala to arbitration, but did not
address the issue of whether the arbitration provision may have been unconscionable.155 As the court in Fiala points out, the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) disallows simply forbidding arbitration agreements, and requires that
arbitration agreements be held on the same level as other contracts.156 Laws
that seek to flat out disallow arbitration agreements tend to be struck down
as preempted by the FAA, and so arbitration agreements may only be determined as invalid when they are revoked based on grounds that exist under
law or equity for the revocation of any other contract.157 The Illinois Nursing
Home Care Act158 was one such statute that was struck down for trying to
protect residents from arbitration agreements and the devastating effects that

150. Id. at 734-35.
151. Romano ex rel. Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Fiala v. Bickford Senior Living Grp., 32 N.E.3d 80, 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/3-606 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-906 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.) (preempted by Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 927 N.E.2d 1207, 1215
(Ill. 2010)).
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they can so often have on this class of people.159 The statute specifically precluded the ability for a resident to waive the right to commence an action,
and so it was ruled as preempted.
Any waiver by a resident or his legal representative
of the right to commence an action under Sections
3-601 through 3-607, whether oral or in writing,
shall be null and void, and without legal force or effect.160
Any party to an action brought under Sections 3601 through 3-607 shall be entitled to a trial by jury
and any waiver of the right to a trial by a jury,
whether oral or in writing, prior to the commencement of an action, shall be null and void, and without legal force or effect.161
The clear purpose of this statute was to protect nursing home residents
because they are so often unable to protect themselves.162 Although the FAA
requires that arbitration agreements be placed on equal footing with other
agreements, it does not mean that agreements that are unconscionable must
be left to fester and harm those inflicted by them.163 A contract that is unconscionable can still be found unenforceable even if it has an arbitration agreement within it, because the FAA does not preempt finding arbitration agreements invalid “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity” that would
revoke any other contract.164 Arbitration agreements are in most nursing
home admission agreements already, but residents still need to be protected.
This is why unconscionability checks are so important.
The court in Fiala should have addressed the conscionability of the arbitration agreement, because even if that particular clause was not unconscionable it would have set Illinois precedent on a course that is aligned with
better public policy. In Illinois, a contractual clause may be found unconscionable either “procedurally,” “substantively,” or both.165 When terms of a
159. See Fiala, 32 N.E.3d at 94.
160. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/3-606 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-906 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.) (preempted by Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 927 N.E.2d 1207, 1215
(Ill. 2010)).
161. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/3-607 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-906 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.) (preempted by Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 927 N.E.2d 1207, 1215
(Ill. 2010)).
162. See id.
163. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2016) (arbitration agreements can still be unenforceable for any
reason another contract may be deemed unenforceable in law or equity).
164. Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 261 (Ill. 2006).
165. Wigginton v. Dell, Inc., 890 N.E.2d 541, 547 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
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contract are deemed unconscionable, those terms will be removed, and when
possible, the remainder will be enforced.166 Procedural unconscionability, in
this context, “refers to a situation where a term is so difficult to find, read, or
understand that the [party] cannot fairly be said to have been aware he was
agreeing to it, and also takes into account a lack of bargaining power.”167
Substantive unconscionability occurs when the terms of the provision “are
inordinately one-sided in one party’s favor.”168
Procedural unconscionability occurs when the terms are so difficult to
find, read, or understand that it keeps the non-drafting party from being able
to sufficiently be aware of the terms.169 Contracts of adhesion occur when
parties have unequal bargaining power and the party with the superior bargaining position presents the terms of the contract on a take it or leave it
basis.170 Although the finding that an agreement is a contract of adhesion is
insufficient to invalidate the agreement, it can be a determining factor.171 Factors of procedural unconscionability can involve impropriety during the formation of the contract.172 The circumstances surrounding the formation of
the contract are important for determining whether each party had a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms, how conspicuous important factors
are, and whether the terms were negotiated for.173 These factors are all important but not individually conclusive in determining unconscionability.174
Substantive unconscionability occurs when the terms of the contract are
inordinately skewed in one party’s favor or overly harsh.175 The common
reasons why arbitration agreements are determined unconscionable in Illinois
are because they call for biased arbitrators, are prohibitively costly, difficult
to use, contain option clauses, or lack consideration.176
Where arbitration agreements call for arbitrators with a clear pre-existing bias, it will be determined unconscionable even if it is only a slight
bias.177 This can occur where an institution is known to regularly draft arbitration agreements, because by doing so these institutions regularly create
166. Razor v. Hyundai Motor Am., 854 N.E.2d 607, 622 (Ill. 2006).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Wigginton v. Dell, Inc., 890 N.E.2d 541, 546 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
171. See id.
172. Frank’s Maint. & Eng’g, Inc. v. C. A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 410 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980).
173. Id. at 411.
174. Id.
175. Razor v. Hyundai Motor Am., 854 N.E.2d 607, 622 (Ill. 2006).
176. Edward Clancy, Arbitration Clauses in Nursing Home Contracts: FAA Preempts
Illinois State Law Restrictions, ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N (Dec. 2010), https://www.isba.org/sections/healthcare/newsletter/2010/12/arbitrationclausesinnursinghomecontractsfaapreempts.
177. Giddens v. Board of Educ. of Chi., 75 N.E.2d 286, 291 (Ill. 1947).

2016]

THE FATAL FIALA FLAW

57

business for the arbitrators and may carry additional favor from them because
of it.178 Bias can also be found where the arbitrator and one of the parties
meet separately concerning a different matter, especially if this other matter
is not disclosed.179
Arbitration clauses that unduly burden parties with prohibitive costs or
unreasonable venues are substantively unconscionable.180 When arbitration
provisions require residents to pay some or all of the administrative costs of
arbitration, the clause can be considered as discouraging dispute resolution
and therefore unconscionable, but agreements are generally upheld that allocate equal shares of the expenses divided amongst the parties.181 A party that
seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement as being prohibitively expensive
bears the burden of proving the prohibitive costs.182 Also, venues that are
deemed unreasonably inconvenient for non-drafting parties are generally
considered unenforceable.183
Option clauses can also be considered unconscionable when they do not
provide consideration for the non-drafting parties.184 Option contracts occur
when non-drafting parties are bound to arbitration, but the drafting party either has a choice whether to bring a claim in court or to arbitration.185 Although the agreements do not need to be identical, both parties must be reasonably bound or have options that provide both parties some form of consideration for relinquishing their right to access the courts.186

VI.

BACK TO THE LEGISLATIVE DRAWING BOARD

Although the Nursing Home Care Act’s provision that limited nursing
home arbitration agreements in Illinois was preempted by the FAA, there is
still more that can be done.187 Ideally, Illinois could pass a statute similar to
Colorado’s that would prevent healthcare facilities from requiring arbitration
agreements to be admitted into the facility, but first Illinois needs to determine what makes Colorado’s §13-64-403 so different from Illinois Nursing
Home Care Act Statute.188 Like Illinois’s preempted statute, Colorado’s §13178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
(Ill. 2010).
188.
906 of the

Clancy, supra note 176.
Drinane v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 606 N.E.2d 1181, 1185 (Ill. 1992).
Clancy, supra note 176.
Clancy, supra note 176.
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000).
Clancy, supra note 176.
Clancy, supra note 176.
Clancy, supra note 176.
See Clancy, supra note 176.
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 927 N.E.2d 1207, 1215
Compare 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/3-607 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 992016 Reg. Sess. 2016) (preempted by Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 927

58

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

8.1

64-403189 precludes arbitration agreements from being required by nursing
homes, but Colorado actually goes one step further by explicitly stating that
care cannot be withheld for refusing to sign an arbitration agreement. The
Colorado statute requires the following language to be printed immediately
before the signature line as bold-faced with a minimum of ten-point font.190
NO HEALTH CARE PROVIDER SHALL
WITHHOLD
THE
PROVISION
OF
EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES TO ANY
PERSON BECAUSE OF THAT PERSON’S
FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO SIGN AN
AGREEMENT CONTAINING A PROVISION
FOR BINDING ARBITRATION OF ANY
DISPUTE ARISING AS TO PROFESSIONAL
NEGLIGENCE OF THE PROVIDER.
NO HEALTH CARE PROVIDER SHALL
REFUSE TO PROVIDE MEDICAL CARE
SERVICES TO ANY PATIENT SOLELY
BECAUSE SUCH PATIENT REFUSED TO SIGN
SUCH AN AGREEMENT OR EXERCISED THE
NINETY-DAY RIGHT OF RESCISSION.191
The Nursing Home Care Act provisions were found to be preempted by
the FAA because it treated arbitration agreements different than other contracts.192 The general rule is that when a statute is not of general applicability
to contracts and specifically restricts arbitration agreements then it is
preempted by the FAA.193 Although this is true, there is another fascinating
twist, or loophole, to muddy the waters.194 The McCarran – Ferguson Act195
(MFA) states that:
(a) State regulation

N.E.2d 1207, 1215 (Ill. 2010)), with COLO. REV. ANN. § 13-64-403 (West, Westlaw through
the 2d Reg. Sess. of the 70th Gen. Assemb. 2016).
189. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403 (West, Westlaw through the 2d Reg. Sess.
of the 70th Gen. Assemb. 2016).
190. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403(4) (West, Westlaw through the 2d Reg. Sess.
of the 70th Gen. Assemb. 2016).
191. Id.
192. Carter, 927 N.E.2d at 1215.
193. Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 381 (Colo. 2003).
194. See id. at 382.
195. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2015).
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The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation
of such business.
(b) Federal regulation
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30,
1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known
as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15,
1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and
the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended [15
U.S.C.A. 41 et seq.], shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is
not regulated by State law.196
This statute is applicable, because §13-64-403197 in its first subpart states:
(1) It is the intent of the general assembly that an
arbitration agreement be a voluntary agreement between a patient and a health care provider and no
medical malpractice insurer shall require a health
care provider to utilize arbitration agreements as a
condition of providing medical malpractice insurance to such health care provider. Making the use of
arbitration agreements a condition to the provision
of medical malpractice insurance shall constitute an
unfair insurance practice and shall be subject to the
provisions, remedies, and penalties prescribed in
part 11 of article 3 of title 10, C.R.S.198

196. Id.
197. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-64-403(7) (West, Westlaw through the 2d Reg. Sess.
of the 70th Gen. Assemb. 2016).
198. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-64-403(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2d Reg. Sess.
of the 70th Gen. Assemb. 2016).
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Because the first part of the statute explicitly applies to the relationship
between insurance providers and the insured, it triggers the MFA.199 Although the FAA would generally preempt the statute because it targets arbitration agreements, it cannot do so in this specific instance because the MFA
“reverse-preempts” the FAA’s preemption of Colorado’s arbitration regulations.200
The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that, because the purpose of § 1364-403201 was to regulate insurance relationships, “it is irrelevant that other
sections . . . address . . . issues not involving the relationship between an
insurer and insured.”202 The Supreme Court has held that statutes under the
MFA are “enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance”
even though they also regulate policy holders.203
Although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the question of
whether and how such reverse-preemption applies to the FAA, there has already been some disagreement with Colorado’s holding.204 Other courts,
such as the Texas Supreme Court, believe that a broader view still needs to
be taken when deciding issues under the MFA.205 The court in Fredericksburg Care Co. v. Perez,206 stressed that the MFA “exempts from preemption
‘any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance.’”207 The Supreme Court’s ruling in U.S. Dept. of Treasury v.
Fabe,208 exempted an Ohio statute from preemption under the MFA, but the
extent to which the exemption can be applied to statutes that purposefully
target arbitration agreements between healthcare providers and patients is
unclear.209

VII.

OTHER POTENTIAL REGULATORY STEPS

On Thursday, July 16, 2015, CMS proposed changes to require nursing
homes to fully explain arbitration agreements to residents and their agents,
and that the agreements must be entered into voluntarily.210 This proposal
199. Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 381 (Colo. 2003).
200. Id.
201. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-64-403(7) (West, Westlaw through the 2d Reg. Sess.
of the 70th Gen. Assemb. 2016).
202. Allen, 71 P.3d at 383.
203. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 508 (1993).
204. See Fredericksburg Care Co. v. Perez, 461 S.W.3d 513, 525 (Tex. 2015).
205. Id. at 521.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 520.
208. Fabe, 508 U.S. at 491.
209. Munich Am. Reinsurance Co., v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 585, 592 (5th Cir. 1998).
210. Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 42168,
42172 (July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n)).
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was due to concerns that facilities would use their superior bargaining power
to coerce the residents into waiving their rights.211 The proposed rule would
also prevent arbitration agreements from being placed with any other paperwork in order to draw additional attention to those specific provisions. 212
There was even discussion that arbitration agreements should be altogether
banned from being used with nursing home residents.213 All of these changes
were proposed because of concerns voiced to CMS that residents were being
taken advantage of by the facilities.214 These proposals show that there is an
ongoing concern that nursing home residents are being made to waive their
rights without even knowing what they are giving up.215 This is especially
true where treatment decisions must be made quickly because the residents
or their proxies may not have time to analyze the potential effects that signing
an arbitration agreement might have.216 The reality is that people are not always provided the time and opportunity with which they can adequately research all the elements that should be considered when selecting a nursing
home, and so there is a growing concern that these residents need additional
protection from the facilities that they are already so dependent on.217 The
proposed rule would be 42 C.F.R. §483.70(n):
Binding arbitration agreements. If the facility enters
into an agreement for binding arbitration with its
residents: (1) The facility must ensure that: (i) The
agreement is explained to the resident in a form and
manner that he or she understands, including in a
language the resident understands, and (ii) The resident acknowledges that he or she understands the
agreement. (2) The agreement must: (i) Be entered
into by the resident voluntarily; (ii) Provide for the
selection of a neutral arbiter; (iii) Provide for selection of a venue convenient to both parties. (3) Admission to the facility must not be contingent upon
the resident or the resident representative signing a
binding arbitration agreement. (4) The agreement
must not contain any language that prohibits or discourages the resident or anyone else from com-

211. Id. at 42211.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 42168,
42242 (July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n)).
216. Id.
217. Id.
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municating with Federal, State, or local officials, including but not limited to, Federal and State surveyors, other federal or state health department employees, and representatives of the Office of the
State Long-Term Care Ombudsman, in accordance
with § 483.11(i). (5) The agreement may be signed
by another individual if: (i) Allowed by state law;
(ii) All of the requirements in this section are met;
and (iii) That individual has no interest in the facility.218
Thankfully, this proposed rule was accepted in September 2016, and
was codified November, 2016 as 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n).219 This rule should
steer Illinois case law back on track, but the rule will meet stiff opposition
from nursing homes.220

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Nursing home residents do not choose to live there because they are
vigorous and strong, but because they lack to ability to fulfill at least some
of their basic living needs. As these residents become further unable to care
for themselves they must rely on their loved ones for even their most crucial
decisions.221 These loved ones fill out the various forms as healthcare proxies
and take on the crucial role of deciding healthcare treatment decisions.222 The
problem is that these healthcare proxies are not selected because they are
savvy healthcare consumers, but because they are loved and trusted by the
residents.223 Although love and trust are essential components of the
healthcare proxy relationship these elements can act as blinders during some
of the most crucial healthcare decisions.
When residents are admitted into healthcare facilities their healthcare
proxies are called upon to fulfill their duties to make the best possible decisions, but this can be extremely difficult to do when these proxies are caught
up with the pain and suffering that their loved one is going through. The difficult process often causes important aspects of admittance to be overlooked,
218. Id. at 264-65.
219. 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n) (2016).
220. Rebecca Hersher, New Rule Preserves Patients’ Rights to Sue Nursing Homes In
Court, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 29, 2016, 2:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/09/29/495918132/new-rule-preserves-patients-rights-to-sue-nursing-homes-incourt.
221. Giving Someone a Power of Attorney for Your Health-Care, supra note 3.
222. Making Medical Decisions for Someone Else, supra note 17.
223. Giving Someone a Power of Attorney for Your Health-Care, supra note 3.
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and one such aspect is frequently the existence and meaning of arbitration
agreements.224 These arbitration agreements can be outside the scope of the
healthcare proxy’s authority, and so courts are often forced to resolve how
and when a principal can be bound to arbitration.225 States have been creating
conflicting rulings concerning the authority of healthcare agents, but it is crucial to keep important societal goals in view when deciding such cases.226
The important societal goal here is protecting nursing home residents who
already must rely on others for so much.227 These people are less able to protect themselves and so the responsibility must lie with others. State legislatures and Federal agencies have both recognized the issues with arbitration
provisions in nursing home contracts, but many changes have failed to gain
support or have been deemed as preempted for targeting arbitration agreements.228 Despite these setbacks, there are still protections that can be set in
place by enacting statutes such as Colorado’s that can reverse-preempt the
FAA in order to protect nursing home residents from arbitration.229 Courts
can also follow the Conscionable group’s precedent which requires an analysis of conscionability after determining that the healthcare proxy did in fact
have the authority to bind the principal.230 Through these methods we may
be able protect our parents, friends, and eventually even ourselves.

224. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Requirement for Long-Term Care
Facilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 42168, 42211 (proposed July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
483.70(n)).
225. In re Estate of Stahling, 987 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
226. See Reform of Requirement for Long-Term Care Facilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 42211
(proposed July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n)).
227. Id.
228. See 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1-101 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-906
of the 2016 Reg. Sess.); Reform of Requirement for Long-Term Care Facilities, 80 Fed. Reg.
42211 (proposed July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n)).
229. See Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 382 (Colo. 2003).
230. See Owens v. Nat’l Health Corp., 263 S.W.3d 876, 888-89 (Tenn. 2007).

